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Abstract
The original Halpern-Pearl definition of causality
[Halpern and Pearl, 2001] was updated in the jour-
nal version of the paper [Halpern and Pearl, 2005]
to deal with some problems pointed out by Hopkins
and Pearl [2003]. Here the definition is modified
yet again, in a way that (a) leads to a simpler defini-
tion, (b) handles the problems pointed out by Hop-
kins and Pearl, and many others, (c) gives reason-
able answers (that agree with those of the original
and updated definition) in the standard problematic
examples of causality, and (d) has lower complexity
than either the original or updated definitions.
1 Introduction
Causality plays a central role in the way people structure
the world. People constantly seek causal explanations for
their observations. Philosophers have typically distinguished
two notions of causality, which they have called type causal-
ity (sometimes called general causality) and actual causality
(sometimes called token causality or specific causality). Type
causality is perhaps what scientists are most concerned with.
These are general statements, such as “smoking causes lung
cancer” and “printing money causes inflation”. By way of
contrast, actual causality focuses on particular events: “the
fact that David smoked like a chimney for 30 years caused
him to get cancer last year”; “the car’s faulty brakes caused
the accident (not the pouring rain or the driver’s drunken-
ness)”. Here I focus on actual causality.
Despite the fact that the use of causality is ubiquitous, and
that it plays a key role in science and in the determination of
legal cases (among many other things), finding a good defini-
tion of actual causality has proved notoriously difficult. Most
recent definitions of actual causality, going back to the work
of Lewis [1973], involve counterfactuals. The idea is that A
is a cause of B if, had A not happened, B would not have
happened. This is the standard “but-for” test used in the law:
but for A, B would not have occurred.
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However, as is well known, the but-for test is not always
sufficient to determine causality. Consider the following
well-known example, taken from [Paul and Hall, 2013]:
Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them
at a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering
the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accurate,
Billy’s would have shattered the bottle had it not
been preempted by Suzy’s throw.
Here the but-for test fails. Even if Suzy hadn’t thrown, the
bottle would have shattered. Nevertheless, we want to call
Suzy’s throw a cause of the bottle shattering.
Halpern and Pearl [2001] introduced a definition using
structural equations that has proved quite influential. In the
structural-equations approach, the world is assumed to be
characterized by the values of a collection of variables. In this
example, we can use binary variable ST for “Suzy throws”
(ST = 1 if Suzy throws; ST = 0 if she doesn’t), BT for “Billy
throws”, and BS for “bottle shatters”. To show that ST = 1
is a cause of BS = 1, the Halpern-Pearl (henceforth HP) def-
inition allows us to consider a situation where Billy does not
throw (i.e., BT is set to 0). Under that contingency, the but-for
definition works just right: if Suzy doesn’t throw, the bottle
doesn’t shatter, and if Suzy throws, the bottle does shatter.
There is an obvious problem with this approach: it can also
be used to show that Billy’s throw is a cause of the bottle
shattering, which we do not want. Halpern and Pearl deal
with this problem by adding extra variables to the story; this
is needed to make it clear that Suzy and Billy play asymmet-
ric roles. Specifically, they add variables SH (for “Suzy hits
the bottle”) and BH (for “Billy hits the bottle”); in the ac-
tual situation, SH = 1 and BH = 0. By putting appropriate
restrictions on which contingencies can be considered, they
show that the HP definition does indeed allow us to conclude
that ST = 1 is a cause of BS = 1, and BT = 1 is not. (See
Section 3 for details.)
However, the question of which contingencies can be
considered turns out to be subtle. Hopkins and Pearl
[2003] gave an example where the original HP definition
gave arguably inappropriate results; it was updated in the
journal version of the paper [Halpern and Pearl, 2005] in a
way that deals with this example. Further counterexam-
ples were given to the updated definition (see, for exam-
ple, [Hall, 2007; Hiddleston, 2005; Weslake, 2015]). By and
large, these examples can be dealt with by taking into account
considerations of normality and defaults [Halpern, 2008;
Halpern and Hitchcock, 2015] or by adding extra variables to
the model (see [Halpern, 2014]). But these approaches do not
always seem so satisfactory.
In this paper, I further modify the HP definition, by plac-
ing more stringent restrictions on the contingencies that can
be considered. Roughly speaking, when we consider var-
ious contingencies, I do not allow the values of variables
other than that of the putative cause(s) to be changed; I
simply allow values to be frozen at their actual values.
Thus, for example, in the Suzy-Billy example, I do not
consider the contingency where Billy does not throw (since
that would involve change the value of BT from its actual
value). But I do allow BH to be frozen at its actual value
of 0 when considering the possibility that Suzy does not
throw. This results in a definition that is significantly sim-
pler than the HP definition, deals well with all the stan-
dard examples in the literature, and deals with some of
the problem cases better than the HP definition. In addi-
tion, the complexity of computing causality is ∆p, simpler
than that of either the original HP definition or the mod-
ification proposed by HP (cf. [Aleksandrowicz et al., 2014;
Eiter and Lukasiewicz, 2002].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, I review the original and updated HP definitions, and
introduce the modification. In Section 3, I compare the defi-
nitions in various examples, and show that the modified defi-
nition gives more reasonable results than the original and up-
dated definitions. In Section 4, I compare the modified defini-
tion with definitions given by Hitchcock [2001], Hall [2007],
and Pearl [2000]. In Section 5, I consider the complexity of
computing causality under the modified definition. I conclude
in Section 6.
2 The HP definition(s) and the modified
definition
In this section, I review the HP definition of causality and
introduce the modified definition. The reader is encouraged
to consult [Halpern and Pearl, 2005] for further details and
intuition regarding the HP definition. The exposition of the
review material is largely taken from [Halpern, 2008].
2.1 Causal structures
The HP approach assumes that the world is described in terms
of variables and their values. Some variables may have a
causal influence on others. This influence is modeled by a set
of structural equations. It is conceptually useful to split the
variables into two sets: the exogenous variables, whose values
are determined by factors outside the model, and the endoge-
nous variables, whose values are ultimately determined by the
exogenous variables. For example, in a voting scenario, we
could have endogenous variables that describe what the vot-
ers actually do (i.e., which candidate they vote for), exoge-
nous variables that describe the factors that determine how
the voters vote, and a variable describing the outcome (who
wins). The structural equations describe how the outcome is
determined (majority rules; a candidate wins if A and at least
two of B, C, D, and E vote for him; etc.).
Formally, a causal model M is a pair (S,F), where S is
a signature, which explicitly lists the endogenous and exoge-
nous variables and characterizes their possible values, and F
defines a set of modifiable structural equations, relating the
values of the variables. A signature S is a tuple (U ,V ,R),
where U is a set of exogenous variables, V is a set of en-
dogenous variables, and R associates with every variable
Y ∈ U ∪ V a nonempty set R(Y ) of possible values for Y
(that is, the set of values over which Y ranges). For sim-
plicity, I assume here that V is finite, as is R(Y ) for every
endogenous variable Y ∈ V . F associates with each en-
dogenous variable X ∈ V a function denoted FX such that
FX : (×U∈UR(U)) × (×Y ∈V−{X}R(Y )) → R(X). This
mathematical notation just makes precise the fact that FX de-
termines the value ofX , given the values of all the other vari-
ables in U ∪V . If there is one exogenous variable U and three
endogenous variables,X , Y , and Z , then FX defines the val-
ues of X in terms of the values of Y , Z , and U . For example,
we might have FX(u, y, z) = u+ y, which is usually written
as X = U + Y . Thus, if Y = 3 and U = 2, then X = 5,
regardless of how Z is set.1
The structural equations define what happens in the pres-
ence of external interventions. Setting the value of some vari-
able X to x in a causal model M = (S,F) results in a new
causal model, denoted MX←x, which is identical to M , ex-
cept that the equation for X in F is replaced by X = x.
Following [Halpern and Pearl, 2005], I restrict attention
here to what are called recursive (or acyclic) models. This
is the special case where there is some total ordering ≺ of
the endogenous variables (the ones in V) such that if X ≺
Y , then X is independent of Y , that is, FX(. . . , y, . . .) =
FX(. . . , y
′, . . .) for all y, y′ ∈ R(Y ). Intuitively, if a theory
is recursive, there is no feedback. If X ≺ Y , then the value
of X may affect the value of Y , but the value of Y cannot af-
fect the value of X . It should be clear that if M is an acyclic
causal model, then given a context, that is, a setting ~u for the
exogenous variables in U , there is a unique solution for all
the equations. We simply solve for the variables in the order
given by ≺. The value of the variables that come first in the
order, that is, the variables X such that there is no variable Y
such that Y ≺ X , depend only on the exogenous variables,
so their value is immediately determined by the values of the
exogenous variables. The values of variables later in the or-
der can be determined once we have determined the values of
all the variables earlier in the order.
2.2 A language for reasoning about causality
To define causality carefully, it is useful to have a language
to reason about causality. Given a signature S = (U ,V ,R),
a primitive event is a formula of the form X = x, for X ∈ V
and x ∈ R(X). A causal formula (over S) is one of the form
[Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ, where
• ϕ is a Boolean combination of primitive events,
• Y1, . . . , Yk are distinct variables in V , and
1The fact that X is assigned U + Y (i.e., the value of X is the
sum of the values of U and Y ) does not imply that Y is assigned
X − U ; that is, FY (U,X,Z) = X − U does not necessarily hold.
• yi ∈ R(Yi).
Such a formula is abbreviated as [~Y ← ~y]ϕ. The special
case where k = 0 is abbreviated as ϕ. Intuitively, [Y1 ←
y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ says that ϕ would hold if Yi were set to
yi, for i = 1, . . . , k.
A causal formula ψ is true or false in a causal model, given
a context. As usual, I write (M,~u) |= ψ if the causal formula
ψ is true in causal model M given context ~u. The |= relation
is defined inductively. (M,~u) |= X = x if the variable X
has value x in the unique (since we are dealing with acyclic
models) solution to the equations in M in context ~u (that is,
the unique vector of values for the exogenous variables that
simultaneously satisfies all equations in M with the variables
in U set to ~u). The truth of conjunctions and negations is
defined in the standard way. Finally, (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y]ϕ if
(M~Y=~y, ~u) |= ϕ.
2.3 The definition of causality
The original HP definition, the updated HP definition, and the
modification I introduce here all have three clauses, denoted
AC1, AC2, and AC3. The definitions differ only in AC2. AC1
and AC3 are simple and straightforward; all the “heavy lift-
ing” is done by AC2. In all cases, the definition of causality,
like the definition of truth discussed in Section 2.2, is relative
to a model and a context.
Definition 2.1: ~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ in (M,~u) if
the following three conditions hold:
AC1. (M,~u) |= ( ~X = ~x) and (M,~u) |= ϕ.
AC2. Discussed below.
AC3. ~X is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies conditions AC1
and AC2.
AC1 just says that ~X = ~x cannot be considered a cause of
ϕ unless both ~X = ~x and ϕ actually happen. AC3 is a min-
imality condition, which ensures that only those elements of
the conjunction ~X = ~x that are essential are considered part
of a cause; inessential elements are pruned. Without AC3, if
dropping a lit cigarette is a cause of a fire then so is dropping
the cigarette and sneezing.
AC2 is the core of the definition. I start by
presenting the original definition of AC2, taken from
[Halpern and Pearl, 2001]. In this definition, AC2 consists of
two parts, AC2(a) and AC2(b). AC2(a) is a necessity condi-
tion. It says that for X = x to be a cause of ϕ, there must be
a setting x′ such that if X is set to x′, ϕ would not have oc-
curred. This is the but-for clause; but for the fact that X = x
occurred,ϕwould not have occurred. As we saw in the Billy-
Suzy rock-throwing example, the naive but-for clause will not
suffice. The original HP definition allows us to apply the but-
for definition to contingencies where some variables are set
to values other than those that they take in the actual situa-
tion. For example, in the case of Suzy and Billy, we consider
a contingency where Billy does not throw.
AC2(a). There is a partition of V (the set of endogenous
variables) into two disjoint subsets ~Z and ~W (so that
~Z ∩ ~W = ∅) with ~X ⊆ ~Z and a setting ~x′ and ~w of the
variables in ~X and ~W , respectively, such that
(M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w]¬ϕ.
So AC2(a) says that the but-for condition holds under the con-
tingency ~W = ~w.
Unfortunately, AC1, AC2(a), and AC3 do not suffice for a
good definition of causality. In the rock-throwing example,
with just AC1, AC2(a), and AC3, Billy would be a cause of
the bottle shattering. We need a sufficiency condition to block
Billy. Roughly speaking, the sufficiency condition requires
that if ~X is set to ~x, then ϕ holds even if ~W is set to ~w and
all the variables in an arbitrary subset ~Z ′ of ~Z are set to their
values in the actual context (where the value of a variableY in
the actual context is the value y such that (M,u) |= Y = y).
Formally, using the notation of AC2(a), we have
AC2(b). If ~z is such that (M,~u) |= ~Z = ~z, then, for all
subsets ~Z ′ of ~Z , we have
(M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z]ϕ.2
The updated HP definition [Halpern and Pearl, 2005]
strengthens AC2(b) further. Sufficiency is required to hold
if the variables in any subset ~W ′ of ~W are set to the values in
~w (in addition to allowing the variables in any subset ~Z ′ of ~Z
to be set to their values in the actual context). Formally, the
following condition AC2(bu) must hold (the “u” stands for
“updated”):
AC2(bu). If ~z is such that (M,~u) |= ~Z = ~z, then, for all
subsets ~W ′ of ~W and ~Z ′ of ~Z , we have
(M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ′ ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z]ϕ.
Requiring sufficiency to hold for all subsets ~W ′ of ~W is anal-
ogous to requirement in AC2(b) that it hold for all subsets ~Z ′
of ~Z . Some motivation for these requirements is given in the
examples in Section 3.
The modified definition is motivated by the observation
that when we want to argue that Suzy is the cause of the
bottle shattering, and not Billy, we point out that what actu-
ally happened is that Suzy’s throw hit the bottle, while Billy’s
rock didn’t. That is, what matters is what happened in the
actual situation. Thus, the only settings of variables allowed
are ones that occurred in the actual situation. Specifically, the
modified definition simplifies AC2(a) by requiring that the
only setting ~w of the variables in ~W that can be considered is
the value of these variables in the actual context. Here is the
modified AC2(a), which I denote AC2(am) (the m stands for
“modified”):
2There is a slight abuse of notation here. Suppose that ~Z =
(Z1, Z2), ~z = (1, 0), and ~Z′ = (Z1). Then ~Z′ ← ~z is intended
to be an abbreviation for Z1 ← 1; that is, I am ignoring the second
component of ~z here. More generally, when I write ~Z′ ← ~z, I am
picking out the values in ~z that correspond to the variables in ~Z′, and
ignoring those that correspond to the variables in ~Z− ~Z′. I similarly
write ~W ′ ← ~w if ~W ′ is a subset of ~W . Also note that although I
use the vector notation ~Z , I sometimes view ~Z as a set of variables.
AC2(am). There is a set ~W of variables in V and a setting ~x′
of the variables in ~X such that if (M,~u) |= ~W = ~w,
then
(M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w]¬ϕ.
Because ~w is the value of the variables in ~W in the actual con-
text, AC2(bu) follows immediately from AC1 and AC2(am);
so does AC2(b). Thus, there is no need for an analogue to
AC2(b) in the modified definition. Moreover, the modified
definition does not need to mention ~Z (although ~Z can be
taken to be the complement of ~W ).
For future reference, the tuple ( ~W , ~w, ~x′) in AC2 is said to
be a witness to the fact that ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ. (I take
the witness to be (∅, ∅, ~x′) in the special case that ~W = ∅.)
Each conjunct in ~X = ~x is called part of a cause of ϕ in
context (M,~u). As we shall see, what we think of as causes
in natural language often correspond to parts of causes with
the modified HP definition.
The differences between these definitions will become
clearer when I consider a number of examples in the next
section. For ease of reference, I call the definition satisfying
AC2(a) and AC2(b) the original HP definition, the definition
satisfying AC2(a) and AC2(bu) the updated HP definition,
and the definition satisfying AC2(am) the modified definition.
Note that just as there are three versions of AC2, technically,
there are three corresponding versions of AC3. For example,
in the case of the modified definition, AC3 should really say
“there is no subset of ~X satisfying AC1 and AC2(am)”. I will
not bother writing out these versions of AC3; I hope that the
intent is clear whenever I refer to AC3.
At this point, ideally, I would prove a theorem showing
that some variant of the HP definition of actual causality is
is the “right” definition of actual causality. But I know of no
way to argue convincingly that a definition is the “right” one;
the best we can hope to do is to show that it is useful. As a
first step, I show that all definitions agree in the simplest, and
arguably most common case: but-for causes. Formally, say
that X = x is a but-for cause of ϕ in (M,~u) if AC1 holds (so
that (M,~u) |= X = x∧ϕ) and there exists some x′ such that
(M,~u) |= [X ← x′]¬ϕ. Note here I am assuming that the
cause is a single conjunct.
Proposition 2.2: If X = x is a but-for cause of Y = y in
(M,~u), then X = x is a cause of Y = y according to all
three variants of the HP definition.
Proof: Suppose that X = x is a but-for cause of Y = y and
x′ is such that (M,~u) |= [X ← x′]¬ϕ. Then (∅, ∅, x′) is a
witness for X = x′ being a cause of ϕ for all three variants
of the definition. Thus, AC2(a) and AC2(am) hold if we take
~W = ∅. Since (M,~u) |= X = x, if (M,~u) |= ~Z = ~z, where
~Z = V − {X}, then it is easy to see that (M,~u) |= [X ←
x](~Z − ~z): setting X to its actual value does not affect the
actual value of any other variable, since MX←x = M . Sim-
ilarly, M
X←X,~Z←~z = M , so (M,~u) |= [
~X ← ~x, ~Z ′ ← ~z]ϕ
for all subsets ~Z ′ of V−{X}. Thus, AC2(bo) holds. Because
~W = ∅, AC2(bu) follows immediately from AC2(bo).
Of course, the definitions do not always agree. As the fol-
lowing theorem shows, the modified definition is more strin-
gent than the original or updated definitions; if X = x is
part of a cause of ϕ according to the modified definition, then
it is also a cause according to both the original and updated
definitions.
Theorem 2.3: If X = x is part of a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) ac-
cording to the modified HP definition, then X = x is a cause
of ϕ in (M,~u) according to both the original and updated HP
definitions.
Proof: See the appendix.
3 Examples
In this section, I consider how the definitions play out in
a number of examples. The first example is taken from
[Halpern and Pearl, 2001], with minor variations.
Example 3.1: An arsonist drops a lit match in a dry forest
and lightning strikes a tree, setting it on fire. Eventually the
forest burns down. We are interested in the cause of the fire.
We can describe the world using three endogenous variables:
• FF for forest fire, where FF = 1 if there is a forest fire
and FF = 0 otherwise;
• L for lightning, where L = 1 if lightning occurred and
L = 0 otherwise;
• MD for match dropped (by arsonist), where MD = 1 if
the arsonist dropped a lit match, and MD = 0 otherwise.
We also have an exogenous variable U that determines
whether the arsonist drops the match and whether there is
lightning. Take R(U) = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ {0, 1}}, where the
arsonist drops the match if i = 1 and the lightning strikes if
j = 1. We are interested in the context (1, 1).
Consider two scenarios. In the first, called the disjunctive
scenario, either the match or the lightning suffice to cause the
fire. In the second, called the conjunctive scenario, both are
needed for the forest to burn down. The scenarios differ in the
equations for FF . In the model MC for the conjunctive sce-
nario, we have the equation FF = min(L,MD) (or FF =
L∧MD , if we identify binary variables with primitive propo-
sitions, where 1 denotes “true”); in the modelMD for the dis-
junctive scenario, we have the equation FF = max(L,MD)
(or FF = L ∨MD ).
In the conjunctive scenario, all the definitions agree that
both the lightning and the arsonist are causes, since each
of L = 1 and MD = 1 is a but-for cause of FF = 1 in
(MC , (1, 1)). This example also shows that all three defini-
tions allow for more than one cause of an effect.
In the disjunctive scenario, the original and updated HP
definitions again would call each of L = 1 and MD = 1
causes. I give the argument here for L = 1. Again, the
fact that AC1 and AC3 hold is immediate. For AC2, let
~Z = {L,FF} and ~W = {MD}. If we set MD = 0, then
if L = 0, FF = 0 (so AC2(a) holds) and if L = 1, then
FF = 1 (even if MD = 0), so AC2(b) and AC2(bu) hold.
However, this argument required setting MD to 0, which is
not its actual value. This is not allowed in the modified defi-
nition. According to the modified definitionL = 1∧MD = 1
is a cause of FF = 1. Intuitively, the values of both L and
MD have to change in order to change the value of FF , so
they are both part of a cause, but not causes. This is but one
instance of how parts of causes in the modified HP definition
play a role analogous to causes in the original and updated
HP definitions.
It is arguably a feature of the original and modified HP defi-
nitions that they call L = 1 and MD = 1 causes of FF = 1,
not just parts of causes. (But see Example 3.6 for more on
this issue.) On the other hand, it is arguably a feature of the
modified definition that it can distinguish the causal structure
of the conjunctive and disjunctive cases.
Example 3.2: Now I consider the rock-throwing example
from the introduction. The naive causal model would just
have endogenous variables BT, ST, and BS, with the equa-
tion BS = ST ∨ BT: the bottle shatters if either Suzy
or Billy throw. As observed in the introduction (and in
[Halpern and Pearl, 2001]), this naive model does not distin-
guish Suzy and Billy, and is isomorphic to the disjunctive
model for the forest fire. To show that Suzy is the cause, we
need a model that takes into account the reason that we think
that Suzy is a cause, namely, it was her rock that hit the bottle.
As suggested by Halpern and Pearl [2001], we can capture
this by adding two new variables to the model:
• BH for “Billy’s rock hits the (intact) bottle”, with values
0 (it doesn’t) and 1 (it does); and
• SH for “Suzy’s rock hits the bottle”, again with values 0
and 1.
We now modify the equations as follows:
• BS is 1 iff one of SH and BH is 1;
• SH is 1 if ST is 1;
• BH = 1 if BT = 1 and SH = 0.
Thus, Billy’s throw hits if Billy throws and Suzy’s rock
doesn’t hit. The last equation implicitly assumes that Suzy
throws slightly ahead of Billy, or slightly harder. Call this
model MRT .
Taking u to be the context where Billy and Suzy both
throw, ST = 1 of BS = 1 in (MRT , u), but BT = 1 is not,
according to all the definitions. But the arguments are some-
what different. I start with the argument for the original and
updated HP definitions. To see that ST = 1 is a cause accord-
ing to these definitions, note that, as usual, it is immediate that
AC1 and AC3 hold. For AC2, choose ~Z = {ST, SH,BH,BS},
~W = {BT}, and w = 0. When BT is set to 0, BS tracks ST: if
Suzy throws, the bottle shatters and if she doesn’t throw, the
bottle does not shatter. To see that BT = 1 is not a cause of
BS = 1, we must check that there is no partition ~Z ∪ ~W of
the endogenous variables that satisfies AC2. Attempting the
symmetric choice with ~Z = {BT,BH, SH BS}, ~W = {ST},
and w = 0 violates AC2(b) and AC2(bu). To see this, take
~Z ′ = {BH}. In the context where Suzy and Billy both throw,
BH = 0. If BH is set to 0, the bottle does not shatter if
Billy throws and Suzy does not. It is precisely because, in
this context, Suzy’s throw hits the bottle and Billy’s does not
that the original and updated HP definitions declare Suzy’s
throw to be the cause of the bottle shattering. AC2(b) and
AC2(bu) capture that intuition by forcing us to consider the
contingency where BH = 0 (i.e., where BH takes on its ac-
tual value), despite the fact that Billy throws. (To show that
Billy’s throw is not a cause, we also have to check all the
other partitions of the variables; this is left to the reader.)
The modified definition works differently. First, to show
that ST = 1 is cause, we take ~W = {BH} and w = 0; that
is, we hold BH at its actual value of 0. Now if ST = 0, then
BS = 0, showing that AC2(am) holds; even if BT = 1, the
fact that BH = 0 means that the bottle does not shatter. (Note
that we could have also taken ~W = {BH} in the original and
updated definitions to show that ST = 1 is a cause of BS = 1.)
Showing that Billy’s throw is not a cause is much easier under
the modified definition: there are no variables that can be held
at their current value such that if BT = 0 we would have
BS = 0. Since, in the actual situation, ST = SH = 1, the
bottle shatters no matter what Billy does.3
I next consider the Hopkins and Pearl [2003] example that
resulted in the change from the original definition to the up-
dated definition.
Example 3.3: Suppose that a prisoner dies either if A loads
B’s gun and B shoots, or if C loads and shoots his gun. Tak-
ing D to represent the prisoner’s death and making the obvi-
ous assumptions about the meaning of the variables, we have
that D = (A ∧ B) ∨ C. Suppose that in the actual con-
text u, A loads B’s gun, B does not shoot, but C does load
and shoot his gun, so that the prisoner dies. That is, A = 1,
B = 0, and C = 1. Clearly C = 1 is a cause of D = 1. We
would not want to say that A = 1 is a cause of D = 1, given
that B did not shoot (i.e., given that B = 0). However, the
original HP definition does exactly that. Let ~W = {B,C}
and consider the contingency where B = 1 and C = 0. It
is easy to check that AC2(a) and AC2(b) hold for this con-
tingency, so under the original HP definition, A = 1 is a
cause of D = 1. However, AC2(bu) fails in this case, since
(M,u) |= [A ← 1, C ← 0](D = 0). The key point is that
AC2(bu) says that for A = 1 to be a cause of D = 1, it must
be the case that D = 1 even if only some of the values in ~W
are set to their values in ~w. In this case, by setting only A to
1 and leaving B unset, B takes on its original value of 0, in
which case D = 0. AC2(b) does not consider this case.
The modified definition also gives the appropriate answer
here, but the argument is simpler. Clearly C = 1 is a but-
for cause; it is a cause under the modified definition taking
3The model MRT ′ seems to “bake in” the temporal ordering of
events, in particular, that Suzy’s rock hits before Billy’s rock. It is
not necessary to do this. We can allow who hits first to be determined
by the context, so that there may be a context u′ where Billy hits
first. This does not affect the analysis at all. An alternative approach
to incorporating temporal information is to have time-indexed vari-
ables (e.g., to have a family of variables BSk for “bottle shatters at
time k”). In addition to the model used above, Halpern and Pearl
[2005] consider a model with time-indexed variables. Nothing es-
sential changes in the analysis if we consider such a model.
~W = ∅. A = 1 is not a cause, since there are no variables
whose values we can hold fixed such that then setting A = 0
results in D = 0.
Next, consider “bogus prevention” example due to
Hitchcock [2007] (based on an example due to Hiddle-
ston [2005]), which motivated the addition of normal-
ity considerations to the HP definition [Halpern, 2008;
Halpern and Hitchcock, 2015].
Example 3.4: Assassin is in possession of a lethal poison, but
has a last-minute change of heart and refrains from putting it
in Victim’s coffee. Bodyguard puts antidote in the coffee,
which would have neutralized the poison had there been any.
Victim drinks the coffee and survives. Is Bodyguard’s putting
in the antidote a cause of Victim surviving? Most people
would say no, but according to the original and updated HP
definition, it is. For in the contingency where Assassin puts
in the poison, Victim survives iff Bodyguard puts in the an-
tidote. However, according to the modified definition, it is
not. Even if Bodyguard doesn’t put in the antidote, Victim
survives, as long as we hold any subset of the other variables
at their actual values.
Bodyguard putting in the antidote is part of a cause under
the modified definition. Bodyguard putting in antidote and
Assassin not putting in poison together form a cause. This
does not seem so unreasonable. If Assassin had poisoned the
coffee and Bodyguard hadn’t put in antidote, the king would
have died. However, intuitions may differ here. We might
argue that we don’t need a cause for an event that was ex-
pected all along. Here normality considerations can help. If
we use the extension of the HP definitions to deal with nor-
mality proposed by Hitchcock and Halpern [2015] (which ap-
plies without change to the modified definition), then under
reasonable assumptions, the witness to Bodyguard putting in
antidote being a cause of Victim surviving is the world where
Bodyguard doesn’t put in antidote and Assassin puts in poi-
son. This world is not at least as normal as the actual world
(arguably, it is incomparable in normality to the actual world),
so the Halpern and Hitchcock approach would not declare
Bodyguard (part of) a cause, according to any variant of the
HP definition.
Arguments similar to those used in Example 3.4 also show
that the modified definition gives the appropriate answer in
the case of Hall’s [2007] nonexistent threat. Here C = 1
would have prevented E = 1 had B been 1, but in the actual
context,B = 0 (so we can view B as a potential threat which
is nonexistent in the actual context, since B = 0). The origi-
nal and updated HP definitions declare C = 1 to be a cause,
contrary to intuition (by considering the contingency where
B = 1); the modified HP definition does not.
Halpern [2014] discussed a number of examples from the
literature purportedly showing problems with the updated
definition, and shows that they can be dealt with by using
what is arguably a better model of the situation, with extra
variables. These problems can be dealt with by the modified
definition, without introducing extra variables. I illustrate
this with the following example, due to Weslake [2015].
Example 3.5: A lamp L is controlled by three switches, A,
B, and C, each of which has three possible positions, −1, 0,
and 1. The lamp switches on iff two or more of the switches
are in same position. Thus, L = 1 iff (A = B) ∨ (B =
C) ∨ (A = C). Suppose that, in the actual context, A = 1,
B = −1, andC = −1. Intuition suggests that whileB = −1
and C = −1 should be causes of L = 1, A = 1 should not
be; since the setting of A does not match that of either B or
C, it has no causal impact on the outcome. The original and
updated HP definitions indeed declare B = −1 and C = −1
to be causes; unfortunately, they also declare A = 1 to be a
cause. For in the contingency where B = 1 and C = −1, if
A = 1 then L = 1, while if A = 0 then L = 0. The modified
definition declares B = −1 and C = −1 to be causes (again,
these are but-for causes, so all the definitions agree), but it
does not declareA = 1 to be a cause. The contingency where
B = 1 and C = −1 cannot be considered by the modified
definition.
Example 3.5 is dealt with in [Halpern, 2014] by consider-
ing two stories for why the lamp goes on: the first is Wes-
lake’s story (it switches on if at least two of A, B, and C
have the same setting); the second takes the lamp to switch if
there is a setting i (either −1, 0, or 1) such that none of the
lamps have setting i. Both stories are described by the same
equation for L. But in the second story, it seems reasonable
to call A = 1 a cause of L = 1. By adding variables to the
model, we can distinguish these stories; in these richer mod-
els, the original and updated HP definitions make the “right”
causal judgments. The modified definition agrees with these
judgments. I think that there are good reasons for consider-
ing the richer models. Indeed, if we start with the intuition
given by the second story, then under the modified definition,
it is necessary to consider the richer model to declare A = 1
a cause. Roughly speaking, this is because, under the mod-
ified definition, there must be some variable whose value in
the real world demonstrates the causality. The simple model
whose variables are only A, B, C, and L is not rich enough
to do this.
Halpern [2014] also considers an example of Spohn [2008]
which is similar in spirit. Again, the modified definition han-
dles it appropriately, without needing to add variables to the
model.
Example 3.5 (as well as Example 3.7 below and other ex-
amples considered by Halpern [2014]) show that by adding
variables to describe the mechanism of causality, we can dis-
tinguish two situations which otherwise seem identical. As
the following example (suggested by an anonymous reviewer
of the paper) shows, adding variables that describe the mech-
anism also allows us to convert a part of a cause according to
the modified HP definition to a cause.
Example 3.6: Suppose that we add variables A, B, and C
to the disjunctive forest-fire example (Example 3.1), where
A = L∧¬MD , B = ¬L∧MD , and C = L∧MD . We then
replace the earlier equation for FF (i.e., FF = L ∨MD ) by
FF = A∨B∨C. The variablesA,B, andC can be viewed as
describing the mechanism by which the forest fire happened.
Did it happen because of the dropped match only, because of
the lightning only, or because of both? Alternatively, A, B,
and C could describe the intensity of the forest fire (it might
be more intense if both the arsonist drops a match and the
lightning strikes). Whatever the interpretation, in this model,
not only are L = 1 and MD = 1 causes of FF = 1 accord-
ing to the original and updated HP definitions, they are also
causes according to the modified definition. For if we fix A
and B at their actual values of 0, then FF = 0 if L is set to 0,
so AC2(am) is satisfied and L = 1 is a cause; an analogous
argument applies to MD .
I would argue that this is a feature of the modified defini-
tion, not a bug. Suppose, for example, that we interpret A,
B, and C as describing the mechanism by which the fire oc-
curred. If these variables are in the model, then that suggests
that we care about the mechanism. The fact that L = 1 is part
of the reason that FF = 1 occurred thanks to mechanism C.
While the forest fire would still have occurred if the lightning
hadn’t struck, it would have due to a different mechanism.
The same argument applies if we interpret A, B, and C as
describing the intensity of the fire (or any other feature that
differs depending on whether there was lightning, a dropped
match, or both).
In the original model, we essentially do not care about the
details of how the fire comes about. Now suppose that we
care only about whether lightning was a cause. In that case,
we would add only the variable B, with B = ¬L ∧MD , as
above, and set FF = L∨B. In this case, in the context where
L = MD = 1, all three variants of the HP definition agree
that only L = 1 is a cause of FF = 1; MD = 1 is not (and
is not even part of a cause). Again, I would argue that this is
a feature. The structure of the model tells us that we should
care about how the fire came about, but only to the extent of
whether it was due to L = 1. In the actual context, MD = 1
has no impact on whether L = 1.
The next example, due to Glymour et al. [2010], is also
discussed by Halpern [2014].
Example 3.7: A ranch has five individuals: a1, . . . , a5. They
have to vote on two possible outcomes: staying around the
campfire (O = 0) or going on a round-up (O = 1). Let Ai
be the variable denoting ai’s vote, so Ai = j if ai votes for
outcome j. There is a complicated rule for deciding on the
outcome. If a1 and a2 agree (i.e., ifA1 = A2), then that is the
outcome. If a2, . . . , a5 agree, and a1 votes differently, then
then outcome is given by a1’s vote (i.e.,O = A1). Otherwise,
majority rules. In the actual situation, A1 = A2 = 1 and
A3 = A4 = A5 = 0, so
Using the obvious causal model with just the variables
A1, . . . , A5, O, with an equation describing O in terms of
A1, . . . , A5, it is almost immediate that A1 = 1 is a cause
of O = 1 according to all three definitions, since it is a but-
for cause. Under the original and updated HP definitions, it is
not hard to show that A2 = 1, A3 = 0, A4 = 0, and A5 = 0
are also causes. For example, to see that A2 = 1 is a cause,
consider the contingency where A3 = 1. Now if A2 = 0,
then O = 0 (majority rules); if A2 = 1, then O = 1, since
A1 = A2 = 1, and O = 1 even if A3 is set back to its origi-
nal value of 0. However, under the modified definition, only
A1 = 1 is a cause.
In this case, my intuition declares bothA1 = 1 andA2 = 1
causes. As suggested in [Halpern, 2014], this outcome can be
realized by adding variables to describe the mechanism that
brings about the result; that is, doesO have its value due to the
fact that (1) a1 and a2 agreed, (2) a1 was the only one to vote
a certain way, or (3) majority ruled. Specifically, we can add
three new variables, M1, M2, and M3. These variables have
values in {0, 1, 2}, where Mj = 0 if mechanism j is active
and suggests an outcome 0, Mj = 1 if mechanism j is active
and suggests an outcome of 1, and Mj = 2 if mechanism j is
not active. (We actually don’t need the value M3 = 2; mech-
anism 3 is always active, because there is always a majority
with 5 voters, all of whom must vote.) Note that at most one
of the first two mechanisms can be active. We have obvious
equations linking the value of M1, M2, and M3 to the values
of A1, . . . , A5. In this model, it is easy to see that all three
definitions agree that A1 = 1 and A2 = 1 are both causes of
O = 1. Intuitively, this is because the second mechanism was
the one that led to the outcome.
Example 3.8: As Livengood [2013] points out, under the
original and updated definitions, if there is a 17–2 vote for
candidate A over candidate B, then all of the 17 voters for A
are considered causes of A’s victory, and none of the voters
forB are causes of the victory. On the other hand, if we add a
third candidate C, and the vote is 17–2–0, then the voters for
B suddenly become causes ofA’s victory as well. To see this,
consider a contingency where 8 of the voters for A switch to
C. Then if one of the voters for B votes for C, the result
is a tie; if that voter switches back to B, then A wins (even
if some subset of the voters who switch from A to C switch
back to A). Under the modified definition, any subset of 10
voters for A is a cause of A’s victory, but the voters for B are
not causes of A’s victory.
The following example is due to Hall [2000], and was dis-
cussed by Halpern and Pearl [2005]:
Example 3.9: The engineer is standing by a switch in the
railroad tracks. A train approaches in the distance. She flips
the switch, so that the train travels down the right-hand track,
instead of the left. Since the tracks reconverge up ahead, the
train arrives at its destination all the same.
If we model this story using three variables—F for “flip”,
with values 0 (the engineer doesn’t flip the switch) and 1 (she
does); T for “track”, with values 0 (the train goes on the left-
hand track) and 1 (it goes on the right-hand track); and A for
“arrival”, with values 0 (the train does not arrive at the point
of reconvergence) and 1 (it does)— then all three definitions
agree that flipping the switch is not a cause of the train arriv-
ing. Now, following Halpern and Hitchcock [2010], suppose
that we replace T with two binary variables, LB (which is 0 if
the left-hand track is not blocked, and 1 if it is) and RB. We
have the obvious equations connecting the variables. In the
actual context F = 1 and LB = RB = 0. Under the original
and updated HP definitions, F = 1 is a cause of A = 1. For
in the contingency where LB = 1, if F = 1, the train arrives,
while if F = 0, the train does not arrive.
Roughly speaking, this was dealt with by Halpern and
Hitchcock [2010] by observing that the contingency where
LB = 1 is abnormal; contingencies that are less normal than
the actual situation are not considered. However, Schumacher
[2014] pointed out that this approach runs into problems
when we consider the context where both tracks are blocked.
In this case, the original and updated HP definitions declare
the flip a cause of the train not arriving (by considering the
contingency where LB = 0). And now normality considera-
tions don’t help, since this contingency is more normal than
the actual situation, where the track is not blocked.
With the modified definition, this becomes a non-problem.
Flipping the switch is not a cause of the train arriving if both
tracks are unblocked, nor is it a cause of the train not arriving
of both tracks are blocked.
Hall’s [2007] model of the story uses different variables.
Essentially, instead of the variables LB and RB, he has vari-
ables LT and RT, for “train went on the left track” and “train
went on the right track”. In the actual world, F = 1, RT = 1,
LT = 0, and A = 1. Now F = 1 is a cause of A = 1,
according to the modified definition (as well as the original
and updated HP definitions). If we simply fix LT = 0 and set
F = 0, then A = 0. But here normality conditions do apply:
the world where the train does not go on the left track despite
the switch being set to the left is less normal than the actual
world.
The final two examples consider cases where the the modi-
fied definition by itself arguably does not give the appropriate
answer, but it does when combined with considerations of
normality (in the first example) and responsibility and blame
(in the second example). The first of these examples is taken
from Hitchcock [2007], where it is called “counterexample to
Hitchcock”. Its structure is similar to Hall’s short-circuit ex-
ample [2007][Section 5.3]; the same analysis applies to both.
Example 3.10: Consider a variant of the bogus prevention
problem. Again, Bodyguard puts an antidote in Victim’s cof-
fee, but now Assassin puts the poison in the coffee. However,
Assassin would not have put the poison in the coffee if Body-
guard hadn’t put the antidote in. (Perhaps Assassin is putting
in the poison only to make Bodyguard look good.) Now Vic-
tim drinks the coffee and survives.
Is Bodyguard putting in the antidote a cause of Victim sur-
viving? It is easy to see that, according to all three variants of
the definition, it is. If we fix Assassin’s action, then Victim
survives if and only if Bodyguard puts in the antidote. In-
tuition suggests that this is unreasonable. By putting in the
antidote, Bodyguard neutralizes the effect of the other causal
path he sets in action: Assassin putting in the poison.
Although no variant of the HP definition can deal with this
example, as already pointed out by Hall [2007] and Hitchcock
[2007], by taking into account normality considerations, we
can recover our intuitions. Using, for example, the exten-
sion of the HP definitions to deal with normality proposed
by Hitchcock and Halpern [2015], the witness to Bodyguard
putting in the antidote being a cause of Victim surviving is the
world where Bodyguard doesn’t put in the antidote but Assas-
sin puts in the poison anyway, directly contradicting the story.
This is arguably an abnormal world (much less normal than
the actual world), and thus should not be considered when de-
termining causality, according to the Halpern-Hitchcock ap-
proach (and, for much the same reasons, should not be con-
sidered a cause in the models proposed by Hall [2007] and
Hitchcock [2007]).
The final example touches on issues of legal responsibility.
Example 3.11: Suppose that two companies both dump pol-
lutant into the river. Company A dumps 100 kilograms of
pollutant; company B dumps 60 kilograms. This causes the
fish to die. Biologists determine that k kilograms of pollutant
sufficed to cause the fish to die. Which company is the cause
of the fish dying if k = 120, if k = 80, and if k = 50?
It is easy to see that if k = 120, then both companies
are causes of the fish dying, according to all three definitions
(each company is a but-for cause of the outcome). If k = 50,
then each company is still a cause according to the original
and updated HP definitions. For example, to see that company
B is a cause, we consider the contingency where company A
does not dump any pollutant. Then the fish die if company
B pollutes, but survive if B does not pollute. With the modi-
fied definition, neither company individually is a cause; there
is no variable that we can hold at its actual value that would
make company A or company B a but-for cause. However,
both companies together are the cause.
The situation gets more interesting if k = 80. Now the
modified definition says that only A is a cause; whether or
not we keep A fixed at dumping 100 kilograms of pollutant,
what B does has no impact. The original and updated def-
initions also agree that A is a cause if k = 80. Whether B
is a cause depends on the possible amounts of pollutant that
A can dump. If A can dump only 0 or 100 kilograms of pol-
lutant, then B is not a cause; no setting of A’s action can
result in B’s action making a difference. However, if A can
dump some amount between 21 and 79 kilograms, then B is
a cause.
It’s not clear what the “right” answer should be here if
k = 80. The law typically wants to declare B a contributing
cause to the death of the fish (in addition toA), but should this
depend on the amount of pollutant that A can dump? This is-
sue is perhaps best dealt with by considering an extension to
the HP approach that takes into account degree of respon-
sibility and degree of blame [Chockler and Halpern, 2004;
Zultan et al., 2012]. Degree of blame, in particular, takes
into account the agent’s uncertainty about how much pollu-
tant was dumped. Under reasonable assumptions about the
agent’s degree of uncertainty regarding how likely various
amounts of pollutant are to be dumped, B will get some de-
gree of blame under the modified definition, even when it is
not a cause.
4 Comparison to other approaches
The key difference between the modified HP definition on
the one hand and the original and updated HP definitions on
the other is the insistence that the contingency considered in
AC2(a) be one where all the variables take their initial val-
ues. Doing so makes it clear that the sufficient condition
(AC2(b)/AC2(bu)) is needed only to handle cases where the
variables in the contingency considered take on non-actual
values. The idea of keeping variables fixed at their actual
value when considering changes also arises in other defini-
tions of causality. I focus on three of them here: Pearl’s
[1998; 2000] causal beam definition, what Hall [2007] calls
the H-account, and Hitchcock’s [2001] definition of actual
causality. I briefly compare these alternatives here to the
modified HP definition here.
All the variants of the HP definition were inspired by
Pearl’s original notion of a causal beam [Pearl, 1998].4 It
would take us too far afield to go into the details of the causal
beam definition here. The definition was abandoned due to
problems. (See Example 4.1 below.) However, it is worth
noting that, roughly speaking, according to this definition,
A only qualifies as an actual cause of B if something like
AC2(am) rather than AC2(a) holds; otherwise it is called a
contributory cause. The distinction between actual cause and
contributory cause is lost in the original and updated HP def-
inition. To some extent, it resurfaces in the modified HP def-
inition, since in some cases what the causal beam definition
would classify as a contributory cause but not an actual cause
would be classified as part of a cause but not a cause accord-
ing to the modified HP definition.
Hall [2007] considers a variant of the HP definition that
he calls the H-account. This variant, as well as Hitchcock’s
definition, involve causal paths. A causal path from X to Y
in (M,~u) is a sequence (Z0, . . . , Zk) of variables such that
X = Z0, Y = Zk, and Zi+1 depends on Zi (i.e., if there is
some setting of all the variables in U ∪V other than Zi+1 and
Zi such that varying the value of Zi in the equation FZi+1
for Zi+1 changes the value of Zi+2). Hall takes X = x to
be a cause of Y = y according to the H-account in context
(M,~u) if there is a causal path from X to Y , some setting
~w of variables ~W not on this causal path and setting x′ of X
such that AC2(a) holds, and for all variables Z on the causal
path, (M,~u) |= [ ~W ← ~w](Z = z), where z is the actual
value of Z in (M,~u) (i.e., (M,~u) |= Z = z). This is clearly
a strengthening of AC2(b); if X = x is a cause of Y = y in
(M,~u) according to the H-account, then it is clearly a cause
according to the original and updated HP definitions.
Unfortunately, the H-account is too strong, as the following
example (taken from [Halpern and Pearl, 2005]) shows:
Example 4.1: Suppose that two people vote for a measure,
which will pass if at least one of them votes in favor. In fact,
both of them vote in favor, and the measure passes. This is
isomorphic to the disjunctive version of the forest-fire exam-
ple, but there is a twist: there is a voting machine that tabu-
lates the votes. Thus, the model has four exogenous variables:
V1, V2, M , and P . Vi represents voter i’s vote, M = V1+V2
(so M can have values in {0, 1, 2}) and P = 1 (the mea-
sure passes) if and only if M ≥ 1. In this model, it is easy
to see that V1 = 1 and V2 = 1 are causes of M accord-
ing to the original and updated HP definitions, and parts of
causes according to the modified HP definition (which calls
V1 = 1 ∧ V2 = 1 a cause). However, neither V1 = 1 nor
V2 = 1 is a cause according to the H-account. For example,
to show that V1 = 1 is a cause, we would need to set V2 = 0.
But the causal path from V1 to P must go through M (just
changing V1 while keeping M fixed has no effect on P ), and
4The definition of causal beam in [Pearl, 2000][Chapter 10] is a
modification of the original definition that takes into account con-
cerns raised in an early version of [Halpern and Pearl, 2001]. The
differences are not relevant to this discussion.
if V2 = 0, M does not have it original value. As pointed
out by Halpern and Pearl [2005], this example also causes
problems for the causal beam definition; V1 = 1 is neither
an actual nor a contributory cause of P = 1 according to the
causal beam definition. In general, in showing that X = x is
a cause of Y = y, it seems to be asking too much to require
that changes in the off-path variables have no effect on vari-
ables along the causal path; it seems to suffice to require that
changes in the off-path variables not affect the final outcome
Y = y,
I conclude this section by considering the definition of ac-
tual causality proposed by Hitchcock [2001], which is per-
haps closest in spirit the modified HP definition. Given a
causal path P from X to Y , MP is the reduction of M along
P ifMP obtained fromM by replacing the equation for each
variableW not on the path by the equation W = w, where w
is such that (M,~u) |= W = w.5 Hitchcock takes X = x to
be a cause of X = x if there is a path P from X to Y such
that X = x is a but-for cause of Y = y in MP . Hitchcock’s
insistence on looking at a single causal path causes problems,
as the following example shows.
Example 4.2: Consider a model M with four binary endoge-
nous variables, A, B, C, and D. The value of A is set by the
context; we have the equations B = A, C = A, and D =
B ∨ C. In the actual context A = 1, so B = C = D = 1.
A = 1 is a but-for cause of D = 1, so it is a cause according
to all three variants of the HP definition. There are two causal
paths from A to D: P1 = (A,B,D) and P2 = (A,C,D).
But A = 1 is not a but-for cause of D = 1 in either MP1 or
MP2 . For example, in the case ofMP1 , we must fix C at 1, so
D = 1, independent of the value of A. There does not seem
to be an obvious change to Hitchcock’s definition that would
deal with this problem and maintain the spirit of the modified
HP definition.6
5 The complexity of determining causality
The complexity of determining causality for the original and
updated HP definitions has been completely characterized. To
explain the results, I briefly review some complexity classes:
Recall that the polynomial hierarchy is a hierarchy of com-
plexity classes that generalize NP and co-NP. Let ΣP1 = NP
and ΠP1 = co-NP. For i > 1, define ΣPi = NPΣ
P
i−1 and
ΠPi = (co-NP)Σ
P
i−1 , where, in general,XY denotes the class
of problems solvable by a Turing machine in class X aug-
mented with an oracle for a problem complete for class Y
[Stockmeyer, 1977]. The classes DPk were defined by Alek-
sandrowicz et al. [2014] as follows. For k = 1, 2, . . .,
DPk = {L : ∃L1, L2 : L1 ∈ Σ
P
k , L2 ∈ Π
P
k , L = L1 ∩ L2}.
5Hitchcock does this replacement only for variables W that lie
on some path from X to Y . Doing the replacement for all off-path
variables has no affect on Hitchcock’s definition.
6Hitchcock also considers a variant of his definition where he al-
lows the variablesW off the path to change values to within what he
calls their redundancy range. This change will deal with the prob-
lem in this example, but the resulting definition is then no longer
in the spirit of the modified definition. It is somewhat closer to the
original HP definition, and suffers from other problems.
The class DP1 is the well-known complexity class DP[Papadimitriou and Yannakakis, 1982]. It contains exact
problems such as the language of pairs 〈G, k〉, where G is
a graph that has a maximal clique of size exactly k. As usual,
a language L is DPk -complete if it is in DPk and is the “hard-
est” language in DPk , in the sense that there is a polynomial
time reduction from any language L′ ∈ DPk to L.
As shown by Eiter and Lukasiewicz [2002] and Hopkins
[2001], under the original HP definition, we can always take
causes to be single conjuncts. Using this fact, Eiter and
Lukasiewicz showed that, under the original HP definition,
the complexity of determining whether X = x is a cause of
ϕ is ΣP2 -complete. Halpern [2008] showed that for the up-
dated definition, we cannot always take causes to be single
conjuncts; Aleksandrowicz et al. [2014] showed that the com-
plexity of computing whether ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ under
the updated HP definition is DP2 -complete. Roughly speak-
ing, this is because, under the updated HP definition, check-
ing AC2 is ΣP2 -complete and checking AC3 is ΠP2 -complete.
With the original HP definition, checking AC3 is vacuous,
because causes are always single conjuncts.
I show here that with the modified definition, the complex-
ity of causality is DP1 -complete; checking AC2 drops from
ΣP2 to NP, while checking AC3 drops from ΠP2 to co-NP.
Theorem 5.1: The complexity of determining whether ~X = ~x
is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) is DP1 -complete.
Proof: The argument is similar in spirit to that of
[Aleksandrowicz et al., 2014]. Formally, we want to
show that the language L = {〈M,~u, ϕ, ~X, ~x〉 :
( ~X = ~x) satisfies AC1, AC2(am), and AC3 for ϕ in (M,~u)}
is DP1 -complete. Let
LAC2 = {〈M,~u, ϕ, ~X, ~x〉 : ( ~X = ~x) satisfies
AC1 and AC2(am) for ϕ in (M,~u)},
LAC3 = {〈M,~u, ϕ, ~X, ~x〉 : ( ~X = ~x) satisfies
AC1 and AC3 for ϕ in (M,~u)}.
Clearly L = LAC2 ∩ LAC3. Thus, it suffices to show that
LAC2 is NP-complete and LAC3 is co-NP-complete.
It is easy to see that LAC2 is in NP. Checking that AC1
holds can be done in polynomial time, and to check whether
AC2(am) holds, we can guess ~W and ~x′, and check in poly-
nomial time that (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w]¬ϕ (where ~w
is such that (M,~u) |= ~W = ~w). Similarly, LAC3 is in co-NP,
since checking whether AC3 is not satisfied can be done by
guessing a counterexample and verifying.
To see that LAC2 is NP-hard, we reduce propositional sat-
isfiability to LAC2. Given an arbitrary formula ϕ with prim-
itive propositions X1, . . . , Xn, consider the causal model M
with endogenous variables X0, . . . , Xn, Y , one exogenous
variable U , equations X0 = U , Xi = X0 for i = 1, . . . , n
and Y = X0 ∧ ϕ. Clearly, (M, 0) |= X = 0 ∧ Y = 0. Thus,
X = 0 satisfies AC1 and AC2(am) for Y = 0 in (M, 0) ex-
actly if there is some subset ~W of {X0, . . . , Xn} such that
holding the variables in ~W fixed at 0 and setting all the re-
maining variables to 1 results in Y = 1. But in such an as-
signment, we must have X0 = 1; the setting of the remaining
variables gives a satisfying assignment for ϕ.
To see that LAC3 is co-NP-hard, we reduce unsatisfiability
to LAC3. The idea is very similar to that above. Suppose we
want to check if ϕ is unsatisfiable. We now use endogenous
variables X0, . . . , Xn, Xn+1, Y . We still have the equations
Xi = U for i = 0, . . . , n + 1, but now the equation for Y is
Y = X0 ∧ ϕ ∧ ¬Xn+1. Call this model M ′. Again we have
(M ′, 0) |= ~X = ~0 ∧ Y = 0. It is easy to see that ~X = ~0
satisfies AC1 and AC3 for Y = 0 in (M, 0) exactly if ϕ is
unsatisfiable.
This completes the proof.
Things simplify if we restrict to causes that are single con-
juncts, since in that case, AC3 holds vacuously.
Theorem 5.2: The complexity of determining whetherX = x
is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) is NP-complete.
Proof: The proof follows almost immediately
from the proof of Theorem 5.1. Now we want
to show that L′ = {〈M,~u, ϕ, ~X, ~x〉 : (X =
x) satisfies AC1, AC2(am), and AC3 for ϕ in (M,~u)} is
NP-complete. AC3 trivially holds and, as we have observed,
checking that AC1 and AC2(am) holds is in NP. Moreover,
the proof of Theorem 5.1 shows that AC2(am) is NP-hard
even if we consider only singleton causes.
6 Conclusion
The modified HP definition is only a relatively small modifi-
cation of the original and updated HP definitions (and, for that
matter, of other definitions that have been proposed). But the
modification makes it much simpler (both conceptually and
in terms of its complexity). Moreover, as the example and
discussion in Sections 4 and Section 3 show, small changes
can have significant effects. I have shown that the modified
HP definition does quite well on many of the standard coun-
terexamples in the literature. (It also does well on many oth-
ers not discussed in the paper.) When combined appropri-
ately with notions of normality and responsibility and blame,
it does even better. Of course, this certainly does not prove
that the modified HP definition is the “right” definition. The
literature is littered with attempts to define actual causality
and counterexamples to them. This suggests that we should
keep trying to understand the space of examples, and how
causality interacts with normality, responsibility, and blame.
A Proof of Theorem 2.3
In this appendix, I prove Theorem 2.3. I repeat the statement
of the theorem for the reader’s convenience.
THEOREM 2.3. IfX = x is part of a cause of ϕ in (M,~u)
according to the modified HP definition, then X = x is a
cause of ϕ in (M,~u) according to both the original and up-
dated HP definitions.
Proof: Suppose that X = x is part of a cause of ϕ in (M,~u)
according to the modified HP definition, so that there is a
cause ~X = ~x such that X = x is one of its conjuncts. I
claim that X = x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) according to the
original HP definition. By definition, there must exist a value
~x′ ∈ R( ~X) and a set ~W ⊆ V − ~X such that if (M,~u) |=
~W = ~w, then (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w]¬ϕ. Moreover,
~X is minimal.
To show thatX = x is a cause according to the original HP
definition, we must find an appropriate witness. If ~X = {X},
then it is immediate that ( ~W, ~w, x′) is a witness. If | ~X| > 1,
suppose without loss of generality that ~X = 〈X1, . . . , Xn〉,
and X = X1. In general, if ~Y is a vector, I write ~Y−1 to
denote all components of the vector except the first one, so
that ~X−1 = 〈X2, . . . , Xn〉. I want to show that X1 = x1
is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) according to the original HP def-
inition. Clearly, (M,~u) |= X1 = x1 ∧ ϕ, since ~X = ~x is
a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) according to the modified HP defi-
nition, so AC1 holds. The obvious candidate for a witness
for AC2(a) is ( ~X−1 · ~W, ~x′−1 ~w, x′1), where · is the operator
that concatenates two vectors. This satisfies AC2(a), since
(M,~u) |= [X1 ← x′1, ~X−1 ← ~x
′
−1,
~W ← ~w]¬ϕ by as-
sumption. AC3 trivially holds for X1 = x1, so it remains to
deal with AC2(b). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
(M,~u) |= [X1 ← x1, ~X−1 ← ~x′−1, ~W ← ~w]¬ϕ. This
means that ~X−1 ← ~x−1 satisfies AC2(am), showing that AC3
(more precisely, the version of AC3 appropriate for the modi-
fied HP definition) is violated (taking (〈X1〉· ~W, 〈x1〉·~w, ~x′−1)
as the witness), and ~X ← ~x is not a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) ac-
cording to the modified HP definition, a contradiction. Thus,
(M,~u) |= [X1 ← x1, ~X−1 ← ~x′−1, ~W ← ~w]ϕ.
This does not yet show that AC2(b) holds: there might be
some subset ~Z ′ of variables in V − ~X−1 ∪ ~W that change
value when ~W is set to ~w and ~X−1 is set to ~x−1, and when
these variables are set to their original value in (M,~u), ϕ does
not hold, thus violating AC2(b). More precisely, suppose that
there exists ~Z ′ = 〈Z1, . . . , Zk〉 ⊆ ~Z and values zj 6= z′j
for each variable Zj ∈ ~Z ′ such that (i) (M,~u) |= Zj = zj ,
(ii) (M,~u) |= [X1 ← x1, ~X−1 ← ~x′−1, ~W ← ~w](Zj =
z′j), and (iii) (M,~u) |= [X1 ← x1, ~X−1 ← ~x′−1, ~W ←
~w, ~Z ′ = ~z]¬ϕ. But then ~X = ~x is not a cause of ϕ in (M,~u)
according the modified HP definition. Condition (iii) shows
that AC2(am) is satisfied for ~X−1, taking (〈X1〉· ~W · ~Z ′, 〈x1〉·
~w·~z, ~x′−1) as the witness, so again, AC3 is violated. It follows
that AC2(b) holds. Thus, X = x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u)
according to the original HP definition.
The argument thatX = x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) accord-
ing to the updated HP definition is similar in spirit. Indeed,
we just need to show one more thing. For AC2(bu), we must
show that if ~X ′ ⊆ ~X−1, ~W ′ ⊆ ~W , and ~Z ′ ⊆ ~Z ′ ⊆ ~Z, then
(M,~u) |= [X1 ← x1, ~X
′ ← ~x′, ~W ′ ← ~w, ~Z ′ = ~z]¬ϕ. (1)
(Here I am using the abuse of notation that I referred to in
Section 2.3, where if ~X ′ ⊆ ~X and ~x ∈ R( ~X), I write ~X ′ ←
~x, with the intention that the components of ~x not included in
~X ′ are ignored.) It follows easily from AC1 that (1) holds if
~X ′ = ∅. And if (1) does not hold for some strict nonempty
subset ~X ′ of ~X−1, then ~X = ~x is not a cause of ϕ according
to the modified HP definition because AC3 does not hold;
AC2(am) is satisfied for ~X ′.
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